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INTRUSIONS UPON INFORMATIONAL
SECLUSION IN THE COMPUTER AGE
INTRODUCTION

The use of computers' as a means of accumulating information concerning the personal, economic, and social status of individuals has become widespread 2 in our modern "information
society."'3 Government agencies and private business concerns
now use computers to collect, analyze, store, and disseminate
mass quantities of private and confidential information about individuals. 4 Additionally, the small cost of personal home computers has made information processing available to members
of the general public.5 The advent of data-banks which can be
accessed by remote computer terminals through common telephone lines presents an unprecedented potential for the collec1. Essentially, a computer is a machine which "receives, stores,
manipulates and communicates information." Toong & Gupta, Personal
Computers, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, December 1982, at 87. "Information is entered into the computer by means of a keyboard or is transferred into it
from secondary storage on magnetic tapes or disks. The computer's output
is displayed on a screen . . . [or on] a separate printer unit." Id. at 88.
Computers can transmit or receive signals from other computers by use of a
device called a modem, which transmits computer signals over common telephone lines. Id.
2. Tunick, Computer Law: An Overview, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 315, 332
(1980) (presenting an overview of computer law for legal practitioners with
little background in the area of computers). Computers are used, for example, to manipulate information about an individual's credit, medical services, employment, insurance and education. Id. at n.84.
3. See THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION,
PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY (1977) [hereinafter cited as
PRIVACY REPORT]. The report, which apparently coined the term "information society," recommends that Congress take measures to accord individuals the right to exert some control over information which is maintained
about them by the government and private business concerns. For a discussion of the federal legislation that was enacted after the Privacy Study,
see Trubow & Hudson, The Right to FinancialPrivacyAct of 1978: New Protection from Federal Intrusion, 12 J. MAR.J. PRAC. & PROC. 487 (1979).
4. Soma &Wehmhoefer, A Legal and Technical Assessment of the Effect
of Computers on Privacy, 60 DEN. L.J. 449 (1983) (calling for an international convention to ensure that privacy protections are maintained by
binding agreements that govern information flows).
5. Presently, for a total cost of less than $400, computer systems can be
purchased which can interact with remote data-banks. Super Systems for
Under $1,000, MONEY GUIDE, 1984, at 130. In 1981, approximately 2.8 million
computers were sold. Soma & Wehmhoefer, supra note 4, at 453. By 1985, it
is estimated that computer sales, worldwide, will exceed 50 million units.
Id. "As computers become more readily available to individuals, more personal data will be accessible in machine readable form." Id.
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tion and dissemination of personal information with increasing
6
speed.
The potential for abuse that has accompanied the ability to
make remote computers interact with one another has generated much concern about the individual's privacy interest in
computer stored information. 7 Today's newspapers report of
computer enthusiasts penetrating the computer files of banks,
hospitals and even government agencies.8 Generally, as each
data-bank is penetrated, private and confidential information
concerning individuals is divulged. 9 Intruders who intentionally
gain unauthorized access to personal information do so at the
expense of others' privacy interests. They must be held accountable for their acts. The courts, therefore, must be prepared
to apply the law of privacy to this new phenomenon.
The right of privacy recognizes the right to be free from unauthorized intrusions into private matters. 10 This comment
maintains that information fies in computer data-banks which
contain private and confidential information about individuals
constitute areas of seclusion which current privacy principles
can and must protect. Following a brief discussion of the new
6. Sokolik, Computer Crime-The Need for Deterrent Legislation, 2
COMPUTER L.J. 353, 355 (1980) (discussing the "explosion" of computer
technology).
7. Concern about the effects of computers on privacy has generated a
significant amount of commentary. See, e.g., Freedman, The Right of Privacy in the Age of Computer Data and Processing, 13 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
1361 (1982) (advocating that general and specific standards of privacy law
be transformed into binding covenants among the nations); Linowes, Must
PersonalPrivacyDie in the Computer Age?, 65 A.B.A.J. 1180 (1979) (urging
establishment of a national privacy policy with consistent guidelines);
Miller, PersonalPrivacyin the ComputerAge: The Challenge of a New Technology in an Information-OrientedSociety, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1089 (1969) (examining the existing legal framework's capacity to deal with information
related problems in the computer age); Soma &Wehmhoefer, supra note 4;
Tunick, supra note 2.
8. See, e.g., Computer Whiz Held in Defense "Break-in", Chicago SunTimes, Nov. 4, 1983, at 13, col. 1 (reporting that a young computer enthusiast
had used his personal home computer "to tap into an international computer network linking research agencies working for the Defense Department"); Computers Seized as FBI Probes Wire Fraud, Chicago Sun-Times,
Oct. 14, 1983, at 11, col. 3 (reporting that 12 homes in six states had been
raided by the FBI and that computer equipment was seized which "may
have been used illegally to tap corporate and other commercial computers
for economic gain or to cause damage").
9. See Miller, The Dossier Society, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 154 (examining the
implications of data technology and information systems on individual
privacy).
10. See, e.g., Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976) (intrusion into
private mail actionable); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239
(1964) (landlord's concealing of a listening and recording device in tenant's
bedroom actionable). See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAu. L. REV. 383,
389-92 (1960).
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threat to informational privacy, this comment examines and resolves key issues that may arise in applying the privacy action
of intrusion upon seclusion to the computer age's new means of
invading privacy. Finally, this comment concludes that a cause
of action exists for unauthorized intrusions upon informational
seclusion.
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Recognition of privacy as an independent right is usually
considered to have emanated from an article written by Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890.11 Warren and Brandeis
urged that then existing doctrines, especially those found in the

law of intellectual property, provided principles upon which an
independent right of privacy could be recognized. 12 Shortly
thereafter, in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Co ,13 the
Supreme Court of Georgia became the first court to recognize an
independent right of privacy. 14 Since Pavesich, the vast majority of jurisdictions have adopted the right, either judicially or by
statute, 15 recognizing that the right of privacy is the "most com11. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAnv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
According to Dean Prosser, the right of privacy "is perhaps the outstanding
illustration of the influence of legal periodicals upon the courts." W. PnosSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 802 (4th ed. 1971).

For a thorough

report of the impetus of Warren and Brandeis' article, see Prosser, supra
note 10, at 383.
12. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 11, at 197-205.
13. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (defendant's use of plaintiffs name and
picture in an advertisement held to be an invasion of plaintifrs privacy).
Only three years earlier, the right of privacy had been rejected by the New
York Court of Appeals in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y.
538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902) (defendant made unauthorized use of plaintiffs picture to advertise flour).
14. At the time of Pavesich, other courts were also beginning to seriously consider the right of privacy. See, e.g., Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La.
479, 482, 39 So. 499, 500 (1905) ("Every one who does not violate the law can
insist upon being let alone. In such a case the right of privacy is absolute.").
15. Adoption of the right of privacy has generally occurred in the courts.
See, e.g., Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945);
Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317
(1982); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905);
Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (1952); Munden v.
Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S.W. 1076 (1911); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106
N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973);
Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).
Some courts preferred to leave adoption of the right of privacy to the
legislature. See, e.g., Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 524-25, 73
N.W.2d 803, 806 (1955); Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 434, 75 N.W.2d 925,
927 (1956). The legislatures responded. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201
to 211 (Supp. 1982) (recognizing traditional rights of action for invasion of
privacy); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-28.1 (Supp. 1983) (adopting rights of action for
intrusion, publication of private facts, false light and appropriation); WIs.
STAT. § 895.50 (1982) (recognizing cause of action for invasion of privacy ex-
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prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
16
men."
In 1960, Dean Prosser categorized the more than 300 privacy
cases that had been decided since 1890.17 Prosser found that the
law of privacy was comprised of four types of invasions which,
though having almost nothing in common, constituted an interference with the plaintiff's right "to be let alone.' 8 Prosser categorized the four types of invasions as: 1) intrusion upon
20
seclusion or solitude; 19 2) public disclosure of private facts;
3) placing the plaintiff in a false light;2 1 and 4) appropriation of
cept for the false light action). See generally R.

SMrrH, COMPILATION OF

STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAws (1981) (providing a survey of statutes
relating to privacy).
16. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (holding that the fourth amendment does not prohibit wiretaps).
The view of Justice Brandeis eventually prevailed in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the fourth amendment protects the privacy
of people and not places).
17. See Prosser, supra note 10.
18. Id. at 389.
19. Id. at 339-92. See infra text accompanying notes 52-66 for a discussion of the intrusion upon seclusion action.
20. Prosser, supra note 10, at 392-98. Generally, one who publicly discloses private facts or matters concerning the plaintiff will be held liable if
the disclosure of such facts would be considered highly objectionable to
persons of ordinary sensibilities. Id. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971) (publication of
plaintiff's name in connection with criminal activity that plaintiff was involved in 11 years earlier was highly objectionable and actionable); Munley
v. ISC Financial House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336 (Okla. 1978) (creditor's agents,
who left their business cards tacked to debtor's apartment door following
attempts to contact debtor, did not conduct themselves in an objectionable
manner). Prosser defined the protected interest as "that of reputation, with
the same overtones of mental distress that are present in libel and slander."
Prosser, supra note 10, at 398. When the published matter is of legitimate
concern to the public, or is newsworthy, the publication will not give rise to
liability. See, e.g., Miller v. News Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d 356 (2d Cir. 1971)
(news article reporting of plaintiff's participation in a heroin smuggling syndicate held newsworthy); Hubbard v. Journnal Pub. Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368
P.2d 147 (1962) (newspaper article which reported that plaintiffs older
brother sexually assaulted her and was required to spend 60 days in juvenile home held newsworthy).
21. Prosser, supra note 10, at 398-401. One who publicizes matter which
places another in a false light is liable for invasion of privacy if the false
light would be considered objectionable by reasonable persons. Id. See,
e.g., Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) (article 'They
Ask to be Killed" using a picture of a child that had been hurt in an accident); Rinsley v. Frydman, 221 Kan. 297, 559 P.2d 334 (1977) (publication
that plaintiff, a doctor, had been mentally ill held actionable). If the published statements are true, there is no liability for false light. See, e.g.,
Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-Am., Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 448 A.2d 1317
(1982) (publication that liens and law suits had been ified against plaintiff
not actionable because publication was true).
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the plaintiffrs name or likeness. 22 Prosser's categorization was
subsequently adopted by the American Law Institute 23 and has
24
been generally accepted by the courts.
The right of privacy has been variously defined as the right
to be let alone,25 the right of one's peace of mind,26 the right to
autonomy, 27 and the right to control knowledge about oneself. 28
Perhaps the most inclusive statement of the right, however, was
that of Warren and Brandeis, who suggested that the right was
"that of inviolate personality, '29 the right of the "individual's independence, dignity and integrity. 3 0° "Inviolate personality"
recognizes that every individual is unique and must be able to
determine for himself how personal information will be circulated.3 1 Without "inviolate personality," individuality cannot
22. Prosser, supra note 10, at 401. Appropriation of the plaintiff's name
or likeness for benefit or advantage constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's privacy. Id. The interest protected by this tort, according to Prosser, is plaintiffs proprietary interest in the exclusive use of his identity. Id. at 406. See,
e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905)
(defendant used plaintiffs name and picture for advertising purposes);
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d
454 (1976) (television station showed film of plaintiffs performance as a
"human cannonball"-held not actionable because it was newsworthy). See
also Hinish v. Meir &Frank Co., 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941) (defendant
signed plaintiffs name on a telegram to the governor recommending that
the governor veto certain proposed legislation).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652I (1977).
24. See, e.g., Winegard v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816, 822 (Iowa 1977); Nelson
v. Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Me. 1977); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107,
110, 206 A.2d 239, 241 (1964). It was the courts' general acceptance of Prosser's categorization that prompted Professor Bloustein to write an article
attempting to demonstrate that Prosser was wrong. Bloustein, Privacy as
an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REV.

962, 964 (1964) (considering privacy to be a unitary tort, as opposed to four,
which constitutes an assault upon human dignity).
25. E.g., Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 795 (Me. 1976).
26. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 86,
291 P.2d 194, 197 (1955) (invasion of a person's privacy "impairs the mental
peace and comfort of the person and may cause suffering much more acute
than that caused by bodily injury"), affld second appeal, 158 Cal. App. 2d 53,
322 P.2d 93 (1958).
27. E.g., Price v. Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 257, 239 N.W.2d 905, 910 (1976)
("At the core of . . .privacy . . . is the concept of personal autonomy
...."). See Bazelon, ProbingPrivacy, 12 GoNz. L.REv. 587, 588 (1977) (pri-

vacy as "the unitary concept of separation of self from society").
28. E.g., Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968) (viewing privacy as
necessary to "ends and relations of the most fundamental sort: respect,
love, friendship and trust").
29. Warren &Brandeis, supra note 11, at 205.
30. Bloustein, supra note 24, at 971.
31. Id. See A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33 (1967). "In democratic
societies there is a fundamental belief in the uniqueness of the individual,
in his basic dignity and worth as a creature of God and a human being, and
in the need to maintain social processes that safeguard his sacred individuality." Id. In order to maintain individuality, individuals must be able "to
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32

exist.
However one chooses to define the right of privacy, it is
rather certain that the definition would encompass a right to
grant or deny access to private and confidential information
about ourselves to others. 33 There are certain aspects of each
individual's life, or particular facts concerning each individual's
past, which individuals consider to be "nobody's business." The
various definitions reflect this fact. 34
THE THREAT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY

In the past, information concerning particular individuals
was highly decentralized. 35 Individual records were rarely circulated beyond their place of origin. 36 Personal information was
difficult to secure and compile, making large quantities of information concerning one individual unavailable.3 7 Computer
technology, however, has made these protections part of a lost
era. 38 Information can now be collected, analyzed and disseminated quickly and in great quantity. 39
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others." Id.at 7.
32. See A. WESTIN, supra note 31, at 46 (discussing why individuality
plays an important role in society).
33. See Fried, supra note 28, at 482 (defining privacy as "the control we
have over information about ourselves") (emphasis in original). See also

Duncan & Wolfe, Informational Privacy: The Concept, Its Acceptance and
Affect on State Information Practices, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 273, 276 (1976) (de-

fining informational privacy as "the right of an individual to control the collection, maintenance, use and dissemination of personal information").
34. See, e.g., Duncan & Wolfe, supra note 33, at 276; Freedman, supra
note 7, at 1362 (privacy as "the individual's ability to control the circulation
of information about him or her--a power that is essential to maintaining
social relationships and personal freedom"); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12
HARv.C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977) (privacy "as an autonomy or control
over the intimacies of personal identity"); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42
N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 35-6 (1967) (privacy as "the condition of human life in
which acquaintance with a person or with affairs of his life which are personal to him are limited").
35. Miller, supra note 9, at 158. Information concerning particular individuals was "limited and local in nature." PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 3, at
3. Records pertaining to births, baptisms, marriages and deaths were generally maintained by local churches. Id. Financial records were generally
maintained by local merchants and bankers, and credit was usually extended solely on the basis of the creditor's personal knowledge of the borrower's credit history and circumstances. Id. at 4.
36. PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
37. Miller, supra note 9, at 158.
38. Id.
39. Sokolik, supra note 6, at 355. The rate at which computer technology
has progressed is exemplified by the following analogy:
If the aircraft industry had evolved as spectacularly as the computer
industry over the past 25 years, a Boeing 767 would cost $500 today, and
it would circle the globe in 20 minutes on five gallons of fuel. Such per-

19841

Intrusions Upon Informational Seclusion

Government agencies and private businesses now compile
information about individuals "as a matter of course. '40 Banks,
hospitals, universities, corporations and government agencies
have become information hoarders. According to Professor Arthur Miller.
[Ejach time a citizen files a tax return, applies for life insurance or
a credit card, seeks government benefits, or interviews for a job, a
dossier is opened under his name and his informational profile is
sketched. It has now reached the point at which whenever we
travel on a commercial airline, reserve a room at one of the national
hotel chains, or rent a car we are likely to leave distinctive electronic tracks in the memory of a computer-tracks that can tell a
great deal about our4 activities,
habits, and associations when col1
lected and analyzed.
The threat to informational privacy becomes exceedingly clear2
when one considers the fact that some individual at a remote
computer terminal can gain unauthorized access to such fies
and use or abuse the information as he chooses.
Advances in computer security have been unable to prevent
unauthorized access to computer data-banks.43 The ability to
recognize the vulnerability of data-banks and to develop adequate safeguards lags behind the ability of intruders to gain access to personal ifies. 4" The lack of adequate safeguards
formance would represent a rough analogue of the reduction in cost,
the increase in speed of operation and the decrease in energy consumption of computers.
Toong &Gupta, supra note 1, at 87.
40. PRIVACY, A PUBLIC CONCERN: A RESOURCE DOCUMENT 1 (K. Larsen
ed. 1975). See infra text accompanying note 41.
41. Miller, supra note 9, at 155.
42. Courts have also taken notice of the threat to privacy which is posed
by the computer age. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) ("We
are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government files.").
43. Volgyes, The Investigation,Prosecution,and Preventionof Computer
Crime: A State-of-the-Art Review, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 385, 392 (1980).
"[MIultiple users, dispersed access, and remote manipulation pose

problems that lie outside of the sphere of conventional prevention and detection methods." Id. Management's ability to institute controls cannot
keep up with computer technology. Id. Recognizing potential threats to a

computer system takes time, and instituting adequate safeguards takes an
even longer time. Id. According to some security experts, however, the
amount of computer invasions could be sharply decreased by simple precautions such as instituting longer computer passwords. Browne, Locking
Out the Hackers, DISCOVER, Nov. 1983, at 30, 38. If computer data-bank own-

ers recognized the vulnerability of their computers, a significant number of
intrusions which now occur could be stopped. Id. at 31.
44. Volgyes, supra note 43, at 392. Upon gaining access to a computer's
data-banks, an intruder can perpetrate such crimes as fraud, embezzlement, theft, larceny, extortion, espionage and sabotage. Id. at 386. See, e.g.,
Ward v. Superior Court, 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. 206 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972)
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"threaten[s] to make good the prediction that 'what is whis-

pered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-top.' 45
Informational privacy refers to the right of an individual to
control the extent to which private and confidential information
concerning himself will be collected, maintained, used and disseminated. 46 It is a right to control the way in which an individ47
ual's personal attitudes and beliefs will be known to others. It
is a right which encompasses the power to ensure that private
information which has been disclosed for a particular purpose
will remain confidential. 48
A right of individuals to maintain areas of informational seclusion is essential to preserving individuality.49 Individuality
cannot exist when one's "every need, thought, desire, fancy or
(defendant allegedly gained unauthorized access to a remote computer and
stole a trade secret). See also supra note 8.
Computer crime has been the subject of much commentary. See, e.g.,
Ingraham, On Charging Computer Crime, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 429 (1980) (discussing problems encountered by prosecutors when charging computer
crime); Kling, ComputerAbuse and Computer Crime as OrganizationalActivities, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 403 (1980); Sokolik, supra note 6 (discussing the
need for computer crime legislation).
In order to combat computer crime, some states have enacted "computer crime" statutes. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West Supp. 1983);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 15-1, 16-9 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-16A-1 to 4
(Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-701 to 703 (Supp. 1983). See generally
M. BENDER, COMPUTER LAw: EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE

§ 4.07,

at 4-71 (1982)

(complete list of current computer crime statutes), As a representative example, the Utah computer crime statute provides, in part:
76-6-703 Computer Fraud Act--Offenses-Degree of Offense. Any person who willfully gains access to any computer, computer system, computer network, computer software, computer program or any computer
property, who knowingly and willfully provides false information or
who causes any other person directly or indirectly to enter false information into any computer, computer system, computer software, computer program, and thereby devises or executes any scheme or artifice
to defraud or obtain money, property, or services, including the unauthorized use of computer time, under false pretenses, representations,
or promises, including representations made to a computer, and
thereby alters, damages or destroys any computer, computer system,
computer network, computer software, computer program, or computer
property, is guilty of a criminal offense ....
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-703 (Supp. 1983).
45. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 11, at 195.
46. See Comment, The Use and Abuse of Computerized Information:
Striking a Balance Between Personal Privacy Interests and Organizational
Information Needs, 44 ALB. L. REV. 589, 601 (1980) [hereinafter cited as The
Use and Abuse of Computerized Information] (proposing enactment of
statutes to resolve conflicts between individual privacy rights and business
information needs).
47. Id. at 600.
48. Id. at 602.
49. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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gratification is subject to public scrutiny. '50 If personal privacy
is to survive the computer age, all courts must recognize the
right of individuals to maintain areas of informational seclusion.
Absent strict application of privacy law to this new means of invading informational privacy, the computer age "will turn society into a transparent world in which our home, finances, and
our associations are bared to the most casual observer."5' Unauthorized prying into private or confidential information of or
about another is an intrusion upon seclusion which ought to be
held actionable with limited restriction.
INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION

Intentional intrusion upon the solitude or seclusion of another constitutes an actionable invasion of privacy if reasonable
persons would consider the intrusion highly offensive. 52 This
form of invasion of privacy does not require that the private
matters intruded upon be publicized5 3 but, rather, consists
solely of an intentional5 4 intrusion into places or affairs in which
an individual maintains an expectation of privacy.5 5

The de-

fendant's intrusion may be physical as, for example, by unau50. Bloustein, supra note 24, at 1003. According to Professor Bloustein,
without informational privacy:
[The] individual merges with the mass. His opinions, being public,
tend never to be different; his aspirations, being known, tend always to
be conventionally accepted ones; his feelings, being openly exhibited,
tend to lose their quality of unique personal warmth and to become the
feelings of every man. Such a being, although sentient, is fungible; he is
not an individual.
Id.
51. Miller, supra note 9, at 154.
52. See, e.g., Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976) (intrusion into
personal mail actionable); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816
(1952) (defendant landlord and his wife entered tenant's premises and remained for 17 days and nights in living room); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106
N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964) (eavesdropping into tenant's private affairs
with a concealed microphone actionable). See generally Prosser, supra
note 10, at 389-92. Not all jurisdictions have recognized a cause of action for
App. 3d 642, 646,
intrusion upon seclusion. See, e.g., Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill.
391 N.E.2d 54, 57-8 (1979) (noting that, in Illinois, actions for invasion of privacy are limited to appropriation of one's name or likeness).
53. E.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Serv., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705, 709 (Ala.
1983); Lamberto v. Brown, 326 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Iowa 1982). See Prosser,
supra note 10, at 389-92.
54. For a discussion of the standard of fault in privacy cases, see Note,
Tortious Invasion of Privacy: Minnesota as a Model, 4 WM. MIrCHELL L.
REV. 163, 197-205 (1978).
55. E.g., LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533
(1963) (telephone conversations). See also Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Serv.,
Inc., 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983) (employer's intrusive and coercive sexual
demands upon employee, including inquiry into nature of employee's sexual relationship with husband, held actionable as an intrusion).
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room. 5

6

Alternatively, the intrusion may be mechanical, such as by
5 7
eavesdropping or wiretapping.
The applicability of the intrusion upon seclusion action to
the computer age problem of unauthorized access rests primarily upon resolution of two issues. The first issue is whether computer data-banks constitute areas of seclusion. The second
issue is whether gaining unauthorized access to such databanks from a remote computer terminal constitutes an actionable intrusion. In order to state a cause of action for intrusion
upon seclusion, both of these issues must be answered in the
58
affirmative.
56. E.g., Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbett, 27 Ga. App. 365, 108 S.E. 309
(1921) (intrusion into plaintiffs hotel room); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont.
517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (intrusion into plaintiff's apartment).
57. E.g., Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931) (wiretap);
Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964) (microphone).
Wiretapping has been made criminal in a majority of states. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 632 (1970 & Supp. 1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 134, § 15a (1983).
For a complete list of wiretapping statutes, see R. SMrrH, supra note 15, at
23.
58. Once the plaintiff has proved that the defendant intruded into an
area in which plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, general
damages will be presumed if reasonable persons would consider the intrusion highly offensive. See, e.g., Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d
564 (1958) (plaintiff stated cause of action for invasion of privacy without
alleging special damages). The fact that the plaintiff did not suffer any pecuniary harm from the invasion is not important, although proof of such
damage can increase defendant's liability. Prosser, supra note 10, at 409.
While some courts will only award nominal damages absent proof of pecuniary harm, most courts will permit compensatory damages for mental suffering without proof of any physical harm if the defendant's invasion was
willful. See, e.g., Olan Mills, Inc. of Texas v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353 S.W.2d 22
(1962) (plaintiff in appropriation case allowed to recover damages for humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, loss of weight from worry, and
lack of sleep without showing physical injury); Trevino v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 582 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (plaintiff, unable to
prove actual damages, and failing to offer any evidence of mental suffering,
awarded $50 nominal damages for trespass and invasion of privacy).
In awarding damages for unauthorized entry into another's information
files, the courts will probably adhere to these general rules in compensating
the plaintiff for intrusion upon seclusion. However, in many instances, the
measure of compensatory damages may be inadequate. When the intrusion
does not result in pecuniary harm or mental distress, plaintiff may not bring
an intrusion action because of the prospect of recovering nominal damages.
Additionally, nominal or compensatory damages will not act as an adequate
deterrent to intrusions upon informational seclusion when, for example, the
intruder is a large corporation which gains more through its intrusions than
it costs to compensate its victims. It is apparent that, in order to deter intentional intrusions upon informational privacy rights, and to encourage assertion of such rights, courts must be prepared to award punitive damages.
Punitive damages have traditionally been awarded upon a showing that
the defendant acted with malice, or that his conduct was willful. See, e.g.,
Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816, 821 (1952) (exemplary damages awarded against defendant who "invaded and destroyed the privacy
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Data-Banks as Areas of Seclusion
Liability for intrusion upon seclusion can only be predicated
upon a defendant's intrusion into an area in which the plaintiff
held an expectation of privacy. 59 In determining what affairs of

an individual may be protected by expectations of privacy, the
courts generally employ a standard of reasonableness. 6 0 The
plaintiff must demonstrate an actual subjective expectation of
privacy in the particular affairs, and that expectation must be
one which society will accept as reasonable. 61 Courts have
found reasonable expectations of privacy in, for example, one's
person, 62 home, 63 bank accounts 64 and telephone
65
conversations.
Courts have held, and no one would dispute, that one's filing
cabinet or desk drawer generally constitutes an area of seclusion.66 If an intruder enters the filing cabinet or desk in order to
obtain private information, such conduct would amount to an actionable intrusion upon seclusion. The situation is no different
when an intruder gains unauthorized access to computer files
and sacredness" of plaintiffs home). See generally J. GHLARDi & J.KIRCHER,

PuNrrrvE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.14 (1981). Punitive damages
have also been used by the courts in order to deter conduct. Id. See, e.g.,
Strum, Rutger &Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1979); Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525, 531 (Fla.
1974). Intentionally gaining unauthorized access to private or confidential
information ffies with the intent of acquiring private information concerning the plaintiff is in willful disregard of plaintiff's privacy rights and, because few states have adopted criminal sanctions (see supra note 44), may
provide a proper case for awarding punitive damages. In the absence of
tent or willfulness, punitive damages would not be proper. E.g., Estate of
Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 795 (Me. 1976).
59. See cases cited infra notes 62-65.
60. E.g., Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc., 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1961) (jury
question as to whether a reasonable person would find telephone calls objectionable). "It is clear ... that the thing into which there is a prying or
intrusion must be, and be entitled to be, private." Prosser, supra note 10, at
391.
61. See, e.g., Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding reasonable expectations of privacy in personal mail).
62. E.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (granting injunctive relief against defendant who was hindering plaintiffs movement in
public).
63. E.g., Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952) (defendant landlord and his wife entered tenant's premises and remained for 17
days and nights).
64. E.g., Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 13 Cal.
3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974) (evidence resulting from unauthorized disclosure by bank of plaintiff's account suppressed).
65. E.g., LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533
(1963) (eavesdropping).
66. See, e.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.) (intruders broke
into plaintiffs office and took private information), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947
(1969).
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containing private information. The information is no different,
either in its content or reference, and the individual's interest in
keeping the information private has not changed. Only the
means of storing the information is different.
Related to this first issue is the question of whether computer fies maintained by third parties, such as hospitals or
banks, constitute areas of the individual's seclusion. This question necessarily raises the issue of what status the courts give
confidential information. Except in those few situations where
disclosure of the particular information would directly infringe
upon constitutional guarantees, some courts have been reluctant to extend privacy protection
to confidential information
67
held in organization files.

Given the way in which modern information systems can infringe upon the personal autonomy of private individuals, however, any such continued distinction between private and
confidential information must be discarded. The determinative
factor must be, as in all intrusion cases, whether the individual
who disclosed private information reasonably expected that it
would remain confidential. If the expectation of confidentiality
was reasonable, any intrusion into files containing the information should be actionable. 68 Thus, assuming an actual subjec67. The Use and Abuse of Computerized Information, supra note 46, at
596. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of checks and deposit slips).
Miller was overruled by the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3401 et. seq. (1982). See generally Trubow & Hudson, supra note 3.
The confidentiality of information maintained in organizational files has
been protected when disclosure of such information would infringe, for example, upon the right to association. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (protecting the confidentiality of organization
membership lists). See also The Use and Abuse of Computerized Information, supra note 46, at 595. Confidentiality has been protected in other contexts. See, e.g., Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1976) (protecting
expectations of privacy in mail); Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974) (confidentiality of bank records protected); LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio
App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533 (1963) (telephone conversations protected).
68. The proper party plaintiff in an intrusion upon informational seclusion case would be the individual about whom the information concerns,
not necessarily the party storing the information. It is generally agreed that
the right of privacy pertains only to individuals. See Prosser, supra note 10,
at 408-9. Corporations and partnerships cannot assert an invasion of privacy. Id. When an intrusion upon information about the plaintiff occurs,
the plaintiff may be able to join as a defendant the entity or individual
which was storing the information, alleging disclosure of private facts (see
discussion supra note 20). However, under the present state of the law,
that party might not be held liable for the disclosure if the disclosure was
not deliberate. See Grenier, Computers and Privacy: A Proposalfor SelfRegulation, 1970 DuKE L.J. 495, 499 (examining the computer privacy problem and how it will affect computer system operators). Further, the limited
nature of the "publication" may preclude liability. See infra note 87. How-
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tive expectation of privacy, computer data-banks can constitute
areas of seclusion.
Intrusionsfrom Remote Terminals
Once it is determined that data-banks can constitute areas
of seclusion, it is necessary to address the issue of whether gaining unauthorized access to a data-bank from a remote computer
terminal constitutes an actionable intrusion.69 Courts which
have traditionally required a trespass 70 may be hesitant to apply
the intrusion upon seclusion tort to this new means of invading
privacy. If, however, those courts concentrate on the results of
the intrusion, and the prying nature of the defendant's conduct,
rather than on the means employed to effectuate the intrusion,
the intrusion requirement of the tort will be met.
The fact that the defendant never physically enters a domain under the plaintiff's control should be irrelevant in defending an invasion of privacy. Use of a computer to gain
unauthorized access to computer files is similar to other means
of invading seclusion which courts have generally accepted as
giving rise to a cause of action. For example, prying into the
plaintiff's private conversations or activities by mechanical
71
means constitutes an actionable intrusion upon seclusion.
The unreasonableness of the intrusion should not depend
on the means employed to effectuate the intrusion. Whether the
ever, the public interest in preserving the privacy and confidentiality of personal information may engender new formulations of privacy law in order
to ensure complete informational privacy. Grenier, supra, at 501. There
may come a day when the courts "simply hold the computer service company absolutely liable for the unauthorized release" of information, even if
the traditional requirements of the publication action are not met. Id. at 502
(emphasis in original).
69. Access to computer data-banks is often effectuated from a remote
computer terminal. See, e.g., Ward v. Superior Court, 3 Computer L. Serv.
Rep. 206 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972) (where defendant allegedly gained unauthorized access to a remote computer and stole a trade secret). See also supra
note 8.
70. Some jurisdictions have traditionally required that the intrusion be
physical, analogous to a trespass. E.g., Kobeck v. Nabisco, Inc., 166 Ga. App.
652, 305 S.E.2d 183 (1983) (wife had no cause of action against her employer
for showing her absentee record to her husband because she suffered no
physical intrusion of her privacy). The more progressive and accepted
view, however, does not require a physical trespassory invasion. See, e.g.,
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971); Pearson v. Dodd,
410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969). The view rejecting the requirement of a physical intrusion recognizes that "[o]ne's
emotional sanctum is certainly due the same expectations of privacy as
one's physical environment." Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Serv., Inc., 435 So.
2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983).
71. E.g., Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931) (wiretap);
Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964) (microphone).
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intruder uses a third telephone, a hidden microphone, or a computer terminal to accomplish the intrusion into plaintiff's private
matters is not relevant. The fact remains that, by any means,
the intruder invaded an area surrounded by reasonable expectations of privacy. It is the intrusion which is actionable, not the
means employed. Courts, therefore, should not hesitate to find
tort liability when an intruder uses a remote computer terminal.
The substance of the tortious conduct is the prying, not a
trespass.
APPLICATION OF TRADITIONAL

IMIITING FACTORS TO THE

INTRUSION UPON INFORMATIONAL SECLUSION ACTION

Few rights are absolute. In privacy law, several factors
often act to limit or vitiate causes of action for invasion of privacy. The most common factors are consent and public concern.
Though arguments can be made that such limitations should be
made equally applicable in intrusion upon informational seclusion cases, it is apparent that such application would be in disregard of the fundamental concerns which a right of informational
privacy seeks to protect.
Consent
Plaintiff's consent to investigation or disclosure of personal

72
information will preclude an action for invasion of privacy.
Consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. 73 Implied
consent to the investigation of personal information usually
arises in connection with applications for credit, insurance, employment and government benefits. When an individual makes
such applications, he impliedly consents to investigation of the
accuracy of information appearing on the application.7 4 The in7 5
dividual consents, however, only to reasonable investigations.

72. See Prosser, supra note 10, at 419-20.
73. Id. See, e.g., Smith v. WGN, Inc., 47 Ill. App. 2d 183, 185, 197 N.E.2d
482, 484 (1964); Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Comm'n of Muscatine, 304
N.W.2d 239, 249 (Iowa), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981).
74. E.g., Molton v. Commercial Credit Corp., 127 Ga. App. 390, 193 S.E.2d
629 (1972) (authorization for credit bureau to obtain information that might
assist in deciding to grant a home loan). Cf. Jeffers v. City of Seattle, 23
Wash. App. 301, 597 P.2d 899 (1979) (plaintiff waived right of privacy pertaining to his medical condition by requesting a disability pension).
75. Reasonable investigations are those which are limited to the collection of information which is relevant and necessary to the decision being
made. See The Use and Abuse of Computerized Information, supra note 46,
at 601. Overzealous collection of private information by "objectionable
snooping techniques," or collection of information "irrelevant to any legitimate business purpose," can constitute an actionable intrusion upon seclusion. Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 1978) (emphasis in
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What the individual does not consent to is an overly intrusive
investigation into matters which have little or no relation to the
matter at hand. The individual should not be held to have consented to wholesale intrusions into his entire informational
past.
Express authorizations to perform indiscriminate informational searches can be recognized, absent elements of unconscionability. Implied authorizations, however, should not be
recognized as a limit on the right to informational seclusion. To
allow a decision maker to "plug" his computer into any system
containing information concerning the applicant, on the basis of
some "implied" consent, would be in absolute disregard of the
applicant's privacy rights. Computers are used to store a wide
variety of personal information. While some of the information
contained in the data file may be relevant to the matter at hand,
other information may not be relevant. Because of the risk that
irrelevant information might be disclosed, the law cannot risk
implied waivers of the right of informational seclusion.
Matters of Public Concern
An important limitation to actions involving publication
arises when the published matter is of legitimate concern to the
public. 7 6 When the general public interest requires that private
or confidential information concerning the plaintiff be known, no
cause of action for invasion of privacy will accrue upon publication of such information. 77 Though compelling arguments can
be made which support extension of the public interest limitation to actions for intrusion upon informational seclusion, such
original) (consumer reporting firm did not violate plaintiff's privacy by
searching its own fies for information concerning plaintiff).
76. "It has always been considered a defense to a claim of invasion of
privacy by publication ... that the published matter complained of is of
general public interest." Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969). See, e.g., Miller v. News Syndicate Co., 445 F.2d

356 (2d Cir. 1971) (newspaper article reporting of plaintiffs participation in
a heroin smuggling syndicate held newsworthy); Jacova v. Southern Radio
&Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955) (newscast showing plaintiff in gam-

bling raid on cigar store); Hubbard v. Journal Pub. Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d
147 (1962) (article concerning sexual assault of plaintiff). But see Briscoe v.
Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971)
(publication of plaintiff's name in connection with criminal activity 11 years
earlier no longer of legitimate concern to the public). The privilege to publish that which is of legitimate concern to the public received constitutional
protection in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In Time, a false light
case, the court held that publication of misstated facts would not be actionable unless the misstatements were made with knowledge of falsity or in
reckless disregard of the truth. Id. at 389-91. See generally W. PRossER,
supra note 11, at § 118.
77. See supra note 76.
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an extension cannot be made without disregarding those fundamental beliefs upon which the intrusion upon seclusion action is
based.
Those in favor of extending the limitation to the intrusion
action would argue, for example, that no reasonable distinction
can be made between the actions of intrusion and publication of
private facts. 78 Either the public has a right to be informed of
matters of legitimate public concern, or it does not. The only
distinction that can be drawn between the two causes of action
is the nature of the defendant's conduct in relation to the information. It is absurd to allow the publication of certain facts because they are of legitimate public concern and, on the other
hand, to condemn the gathering of such information merely because the plaintiff locked it in his filing cabinet or computer
data-bank. Either the public has a right of access to such information, or it does not.
In response to this argument, those not in favor of extending
the limitation of the publication action to the intrusion action
would urge that it is not the information's seclusion which the
cause of action protects but, rather, the individual's seclusion.
The right to maintain the privacy and confidentiality of personal
information is only an aspect of the solitude that the right of privacy was intended to protect. The right of privacy protects individuality. 79 In order to protect and foster individuality, however,
a right to control access to private and confidential information
must be protected.80 The courts have recognized this.
In Pearsonv. Dodd, 8 1 for example, a United States senator
brought suit against newspaper columnists that had published
columns which related to his alleged past misdeeds. 82 The columnists had obtained their information from two former employees of the plaintiff who had entered the plaintiff's office
without authority and had taken the information. 83 After the
court determined that the publication of the information was
privileged, it next addressed plaintiffs argument that, because
the columnists knew how the information had been obtained,
84
they had committed an actionable intrusion upon seclusion.
78. See supra note 20 for a brief statement of the publication of private
facts action. See also supra note 76.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 25-34.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
81. 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
82. Id. at 703.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 704-05.
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Though the court rejected the plaintiff's argument,8 5 it indicated
that it would have held the columnists liable for intrusion had
they been the ones who took the information from the plaintiff's
office. The court stated:
Where there is intrusion, the intruder should generally be held liable whatever the content of what he learns. An eavesdropper to the
marital bedroom may hear marital intimacies, or he may hear statements of fact or opinion of legitimate interest to the public; for purposes of liability [for intrusion upon seclusion] that should make
no difference.86
Pearson recognized that the intrusion action is designed to
protect an interest different from that which the publication of
private facts action is designed to protect. While the publication
action protects a right to keep private information private,8 7 the
intrusion action seeks to protect a right of solitude. Information
which is maintained within an area of seclusion is protected, not
merely because it is private, but because it is an aspect of a
greater right to individual autonomy within protected areas of
seclusion.
Once it is agreed that computer data-banks, like offices and
marital bedrooms, constitute areas in which individuals can
have reasonable expectations of privacy, the courts must recognize that intrusions into such data-banks violate the individual's
right of privacy and must be actionable no matter what type of
information is revealed. Those seeking access to private or confidential information concerning individuals must be allowed to
do so only with the express authorization of the individual or,
alternatively, through the courts, which would act in a manner
consistent with the privacy rights of the individual.8 8 Absent
85. Id. at 705. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument because to
hold the columnists liable for intrusion "would establish the proposition
that one who receives information from an intruder, knowing it has been
obtained by improper intrusion, is guilty of a tort." Id. The court was not
prepared "to go so far." Id. Accord McNallyv. Pulizter Pub. Co., 532 F.2d 69
(8th Cir.) (newspaper not liable for intrusion by its mere receipt of private
facts which were obtained tortiously), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855 (1976).

86. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.

947 (1969) (emphasis added).

87. While the publication of private facts action is designed to keep private information private, defendant generally will not be held liable when
the publication is limited in scope. See, e.g., Peacock v. Retail Credit Co.,
302 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (disclosure limited to clients of reporting
agency), affd, 429 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 938 (1971). In

order to be actionable, the publication must be to a large number of persons; it must be circulated through the community. E.g., Tureen v. Equifax,
Inc., 571 F.2d 411,418-19 (8th Cir. 1978); Kinsey v. Macur, 107 Cal. App. 3d 265,
270-71, 165 Cal.Rptr. 608, 611 (1980).
88. In some circumstances, the legitimate interests of the public may
outweigh the individual's right to maintain reasonable areas of informa-

tional seclusion. In those cases, after a determination has been made that
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such authorization or court approval, intrusion upon informational seclusion must constitute an actionable violation of the
individual's right of privacy.
CONCLUSION

The use of computers as a means of invading informational
seclusion becomes more frequent every day. Whether technological advances will ever be able to prevent computer intrusions is unknown. Traditional privacy principles must be
invoked to respond to this new means of invading privacy. The
courts must recognize the individual's interest in maintaining
areas of informational seclusion.
For those jurisdictions which have recognized a cause of action for intrusion upon seclusion, providing a civil remedy for
victims of informational intrusion will not require new formulations of their privacy law. In those jurisdictions which have not
recognized the intrusion action, such as Illinois, 89 it must be recognized that adoption of a civil remedy for informational intrusion is necessary in order to vindicate the victim's privacy rights
and to act as a deterrent to such conduct. Only through recognition of the right to informational seclusion can the right of privacy survive the computer age.
John A. McLaughlin

the individual must surrender some of his rights to seclusion, the court
should conduct an in camera examination of the information in order to
separate that which is of greater interest to the public from that which is
not. See Industrial Found. of the South v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540
S.W.2d 668, 686 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977). Respect for the
individual's right of privacy commands, however, recognition of a presumption that the public generally will have no legitimate interest in obtaining
private information about particular individuals. See id. at 685. Judicially
compelled disclosure must be the exception, not the rule.
89. E.g., Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill. App. 3d 642, 646, 391 N.E.2d 54, 57-8 (1979)
(noting that actions for invasion of privacy in Illinois are limited to appropriation of one's name or likeness for commercial purposes). But see Midwest Glass Co. v. Stanford Dev. Co., 34 M1.App. 3d 130, 133-34, 339 N.E.2d 274,
277 (1975) (indicating that public disclosure of a private debt may constitute
an actionable invasion of privacy). See generally Comment, Privacy in Illinois: Torts Without Remedies, 17 J. MAR. L. REV. 799 (1984).

